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Estimating unbiased economies of scale of HIV prevention projects: a case study 1 
of Avahan 2 
 3 
Abstract (208 words) 4 
Governments and donors are investing considerable resources on HIV prevention in 5 
order to scale up these services rapidly. Given the current economic climate, providers 6 
of HIV prevention services increasingly need to demonstrate that these investments 7 
offer good ‘value for money’. One of the primary routes to achieve efficiency is to take 8 
advantage of economies of scale (a reduction in the average cost of a health service as 9 
provision scales-up), yet empirical evidence on economies of scale is scarce. 10 
Methodologically, the estimation of economies of scale is hampered by several 11 
statistical issues preventing causal inference and thus making the estimation of 12 
economies of scale complex. In order to estimate unbiased economies of scale when 13 
scaling up HIV prevention services, we apply our analysis to one of the few HIV 14 
prevention programmes globally delivered at a large scale: the Indian Avahan initiative. 15 
We costed the project in the first four years of its scale-up. We develop a parsimonious 16 
empirical model and apply a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and fixed-17 
effects Instrumental Variable (IV) estimators to estimate unbiased economies of scale. 18 
We find that the scale-up of Avahan has generated high economies of scale suggesting 19 
that cost savings are possible when scaling-up HIV prevention in low and middle 20 
income countries. 21 
Keywords:  economies of scale, efficiency, cost data, causal inference, HIV prevention, 22 
scale-up, Avahan.  23 
JEL classification: C33, C36, D2, I1.  24 
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Research highlights: 25 
 Estimation of economies of scale is hampered by several statistical biases that 26 
prevent from estimating unbiased economies of scale.  27 
 When using appropriate empirical strategies to correct for these biases, we find 28 
that scaling-up HIV prevention interventions generate cost savings in low and 29 




Main text (8312 words) 32 
1. Introduction 33 
The UNAIDS investment approach for an effective response to HIV/AIDS proposes the 34 
scale-up of HIV prevention for key populations as one of its core interventions. 35 
However, resources for expanding HIV prevention to all who may benefit for it remain 36 
scarce. Due to the recent flat-lining of development assistance for health; increased 37 
attention has been placed on identifying efficiency gains in HIV prevention in low and 38 
middle income countries. Recent global resource estimates of HIV prevention are based 39 
on the assumption that efficiency of services can improve with scale-up through 40 
economies of scale (Schwartländer et al., 2011). Yet, little is known about the existence 41 
and strength of these. This paper therefore aims to fill this gap by assessing the extent of 42 
the effect of scale on average cost of HIV prevention to key populations; and by doing so, 43 
to quantify the economies and diseconomies of scale.  44 
Avahan is one of the largest HIV prevention project in the world and it was funded by 45 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF). NGOs are provided grants by Avahan 46 
through state lead partners (SLPs) to build a relationship with key populations (female 47 
sex workers (FSWs) and high risk men who have sex with men/ transgenders (HR-48 
MSM/TG)) in order to provide HIV prevention services. The package of HIV prevention 49 
services provided includes outreach through peers, behaviour change communication, 50 
condom distribution, clinical services for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), 51 
community mobilisation, advocacy and enabling environment activities. Each peer 52 
educator provided services to about 25-50 people, sharing prevention information, 53 
distributing supplies (condoms and lubricants) and providing referral for STI 54 
management. STI clinics followed standard protocols for STI management. Community 55 
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mobilisation, advocacy and enabling environment activities varied across the sites and 56 
included the formation of self-help groups, various drop-in centre events, skills training, 57 
legal literacy workshops, police and stakeholder sensitization, crisis response teams 58 
and access to social entitlements. HIV prevention across all four states was guided by a 59 
common minimum programme. These included a set of implementation standards for 60 
technical and managerial areas, project milestones, a common management framework, 61 
and a common set of indicators. Beyond this, there was flexibility to adapt services 62 
based on local context. 63 
In the 4 study states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra), the 64 
Avahan initiative was implemented by 138 NGOs, supported by 6 state level partners 65 
(SLPs) and by pan-Avahan capacity building partners (contracted by the BMGF, which 66 
also had a national level office at Delhi). SLPs provided technical assistance to develop 67 
programme strategies, developed communication materials, enhanced the expertise of 68 
NGO staff, provided supportive supervision and supported the purchase and 69 
distribution of commodities. At the national level, Avahan developed over-arching 70 
programme strategies and organised annual partners meetings to coordinate with 71 
Indian authorities. The national level office also developed and maintained a 72 
computerised monitoring and information system; provided financial oversight; and 73 
monitored programme evaluation. International and national technical assistance was 74 
primarily focused on enhancing the expertise to deliver STI services, improving 75 
interpersonal communication, and providing support for advocacy and community 76 
mobilisation.  77 
Avahan achieved an exceptionally rapid pace of scale-up of HIV prevention services; 78 
going from a coverage of 22,000 persons covered in December 2003 to 280,000 persons 79 
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reached per year in December 2007 (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2008). In total 80 
in the data we collected, we observe that 725,040 high-risk persons (female sex 81 
workers and their clients and men who have sex with men) were reached between 2004 82 
and 2007, 177 million condoms were directly distributed by Avahan NGOs and 529,381 83 
STI visits were provided. Extensive research has been conducted to evaluate the impact 84 
and cost-effectiveness of the Avahan programme. Pickles et al. (2013) reported a 85 
decline in FSW HIV prevalence and between 142 and 2092 FSW HIV infections averted 86 
per district, with two-fold to nine-fold more among FSW clients. Correspondingly, 87 
Vassall et al. (2014) found a mean incremental cost per HIV infection averted of US$785 88 
and a mean incremental cost per DALY averted of US$46. Future anti-retroviral 89 
treatment (ART) cost savings over the lifetime of the FSW cohort exposed to Avahan 90 
were estimated to be over US$ 77 million.  91 
Despite the policy interest in this area, to date there are very few papers examining the 92 
determinants of average costs of HIV services in low and middle-income countries. 93 
Some recent studies (Marseille et al., 2012; Menzies, Berruti, & Blandford, 2012; Rosen, 94 
Long, & Sanne, 2008) present evidence regarding the relationship between HIV 95 
treatment and hospital size. On a sample of Zambian hospitals, Marseille et al. (2012) 96 
find that when the number of patient-years of ART increases by 1, the average cost 97 
decreases by 0.23 per cent. Menzies et al. (2012) from a sample of 54 clinical sites in 98 
five African countries find that when patient volume is doubled (from 5,000 to 10,000 99 
patients), the average cost decreases by 28%. Other studies examine the relationship 100 
between scale-up and cost of HIV prevention (Dandona et al., 2005; Guinness, 101 
Kumaranayake, & Hanson, 2007; Guinness et al., 2005; Kumaranayake & Watts, 2005; 102 
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Marseille et al., 2007) but these papers did not manage to quantify the extent of 103 
economies of scale; due to the small sample sizes of the data sets used.  104 
During the scale-up of Avahan, we collected an extensive data set on the cost of Avahan 105 
from the 64 districts of the 4 following Avahan states: Andra Pradesh, Karnataka, 106 
Maharastra and Tamil Nadu. In total, 138 Avahan NGOs were costed over 4 years from 107 
2004 to 2007. This is the largest dataset on HIV prevention costs available globally. 108 
Additionally, since we are interested in estimating economies of scale of the whole 109 
programme, above level costs (i.e. programme administration costs, programme 110 
communication costs, state level partner costs, BMGF level costs and Pan-Avahan 111 
capacity building partner costs) are included; which is something that has rarely been 112 
done before. The method to allocate above the NGO level costs is based on programme 113 
records, expenditures reports and interviews with BMGF Avahan and SLP staff.  114 
Although this data set provides a unique opportunity to explore economies of scale, 115 
there are substantial methodological challenges in order to quantify the level of 116 
economies of scale. In fact, while some previous papers have been informative 117 
regarding the main drivers of average cost of ART and HIV prevention services, they fail 118 
to accurately establish a causal effect between scale and average cost (endogeneity 119 
bias). There are several reasons for why these are likely to occur in relation to the 120 
estimation of economies of scale. Firstly, it is conceivable that endogeneity biases may 121 
occur due to the omission of pertinent variables in the analysis. For instance, the 122 
average cost of NGOs (hospitals) may be attributable to the competence and effort of the 123 
manager and peer-educators (health workers). Other important drivers of cost may be 124 
related to the characteristics of the NGO location. For example, Integrated Behavioural 125 
and Biological Assessment (IBBA) data show that the typology of sex-workers (street-126 
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based, bar-based, brothel-based etc.) varies widely between districts (Ramesh et al., 127 
2008). In peri-urban districts most of sex-workers are brothel-based (National AIDS 128 
Research Institute, 2005-2010), while in big cities such as Chennai, Bangalore, Mysore 129 
and Hyderabad, most of sex-workers are street-based – which may mean it is more 130 
costly to reach them. Prices and their variation over time may also differ between 131 
districts and are likely to affect average cost. The longitudinal nature of our data allows 132 
the use of a panel estimator with NGO fixed effects which accounts for NGO time-133 
invariant characteristics that are likely to be correlated both with the NGO size and its 134 
average cost (such as location and district characteristics). While a panel data set allows 135 
to account for unobserved omitted variables that are time-invariant, a common issue 136 
with such longitudinal data is the representativeness of the sample. In the data we have 137 
collected, every NGO that entered in the programme was automatically costed, allowing 138 
having an exhaustive and thus representative sample of the Avahan NGOs over the 139 
period considered. Attrition rate was extremely low; only 4 NGOs were lost over the 4 140 
year period, therefore the data is not likely to suffer from a selection bias.  141 
Secondly, a further potential source of endogeneity is simultaneous relationship 142 
between NGO size and average cost. In fact, the NGO size (or scale) is expected to 143 
influence average costs, which can result in the presence of economies and/or 144 
diseconomies of scale. However, one could argue that average cost may also affect NGO 145 
size since one may expect that NGOs that have a lower average cost will be able to 146 
expand coverage to key populations more easily. If we ignore this simultaneity bias, 147 
then the coefficient associated to NGO size will be artificially overestimated, which 148 
would result in an overestimation of economies of scale. Controlling for all drivers of 149 
average cost can encompass this issue, but given that in reality it is not possible to 150 
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control for all the determinants of average cost, the use of appropriate empirical 151 
strategies is required to infer causality and obtain an unbiased estimation of economies 152 
of scale.   153 
Finally, a last source of endogeneity could be due to random measurement error. In fact, 154 
the scale is measured by the number of persons reached by the Avahan NGO. The 155 
number of persons reached was collected by via the NGO’s routine monitoring system 156 
and could contain some random measurement error.  Random measurement error on 157 
the dependent variable lead to an attenuation (or dilution) bias i.e. to an 158 
underestimation of the coefficient. In an extreme case, imagine that the scale contains 159 
high random errors, then the coefficient associated to average cost will be zero.  160 
In addition to the endogeneity biases, there could be another source of bias. Since we 161 
are interested in estimating economies of scale of the whole programme, the estimation 162 
of NGO average cost requires to allocate above-level costs (i.e. programme 163 
administration costs, programme communication costs, state level partner costs, Bill 164 
and Melinda Gates level costs and Pan-Avahan capacity building partner costs) to 165 
Avahan NGOs. Although, we used several tools to allocate above the NGO level costs 166 
(review of programme records, expenditures reports and interviews with BMGF Avahan 167 
and SLP staff), the allocation of the above-level costs can have an effect in the estimation 168 
of economies of scale. We present the allocation of above-level costs in the descriptive 169 
statistics section to ensure that this is not likely to be an issue in our model. 170 
In order to estimate unbiased economies of scale, we first use a panel estimator with 171 
NGO fixed effects to account for NGO time-invariant characteristics that are likely to be 172 
correlated both with the NGO size and its average cost. Then, in order to test if the 173 
correction of these different sources of endogeneity results in an over- or 174 
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underestimation of the economies of scale, we use a system Generalized Method of 175 
Moments (GMM) and an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. We find that the two 176 
methods lead to similar conclusion.  177 
Overall, the results suggest that the activity of NGOs does not generate any economies of 178 
scale, however to conduct their activities, NGOs rely on large fixed programme costs. 179 
This explains why when we consider the total programme average cost to estimate NGO 180 
costs; we find high economies of scale. Yet programme average costs are often not 181 
properly taken into account in global resource requirements estimate for HIV 182 
(Schwartländer et al., 2011). Instead, it is common practise to use estimates from 183 
studies conducted at the provider level and apply a constant mark-up. A further 184 
important finding is that at the NGO and programme levels, an L-shaped curve was 185 
found to be more appropriate than a U-shaped curve in both cases, consistent with an 186 
absence of diseconomies of scale.  187 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we outline 188 
the elements of the Avahan design that are relevant to the estimation of economies of 189 
scale. The third section provides our descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we outline the 190 
empirical specifications and section 5 describes the econometric results. Finally, 191 
interpretation, policy recommendations and concluding remarks are contained in the 192 
last section.   193 
2. Avahan design and funding mechanism: implications for the analysis of 194 
economies of scale 195 
Broadly the extent of economies of scale observed in HIV prevention programmes may 196 
be explained by the design of the services offered, the funding mechanism that may 197 
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discourage or encourage the realisation of economies of scale and the extent of above 198 
service (programmatic) costs. Economies of scale are commonly found to result from 199 
the: (1) existence of fixed costs, (2) learning by doing, (3) lower input prices due to high 200 
bargaining power of firms and (4) opportunities for specialisation. The industry 201 
analysed in this paper, is however slightly different from other industries, primarily due 202 
to the fact that NGOs do not necessarily operate as profit-maximisers and they are 203 
facing a monopsony funder. Specifically, NGOs buy their inputs (i.e. condoms, Sexually 204 
Transmitted Infections (STI) kits, etc.) from the same provider at a fixed price; and thus 205 
the size of an NGO is not likely to affect input prices. Secondly, NGOs are funded to 206 
provide a set mix of services such as outreach services, STI treatment, condom 207 
distribution and community mobilisation (Wheeler et al., 2012) and have little freedom 208 
to specialise where they perform the best. Thus, in principle NGOs are most likely to 209 
experience economies of scale due to the presence of fixed costs and the learning by 210 
doing that they gain over time.  211 
Economic theory predicts that the cost function of NGOs should have a U-shape, with 212 
the presence of economies of scale at first and then with diseconomies of scale after a 213 
certain level of scale is reached. If NGO average cost is made of fixed costs, then larger 214 
NGOs should be more efficient than the smaller ones since they may be able to spread 215 
fixed costs over many persons. On the other hand, the difficulty to reach new potential 216 
beneficiaries after a certain point and the management complexity increasing with scale 217 
may explain why smaller NGOs may have a lower average cost than the larger ones. 218 
Despite the sound theoretical basis, empirically, a number of studies that have analysed 219 
average cost function of hospitals suggest that the cost function may be more consistent 220 
with an L-shaped curve (Lave & Lave, 1970). In the case of Avahan, an L-shaped 221 
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relationship between scale and average cost may also be hypothesised for several 222 
reasons.  223 
Firstly, during the first year of Avahan, NGOs set their budgets (and staffing levels) on 224 
the basis of the number of key population members in the district estimated through 225 
mapping and various forms of size estimation (Blanchard et al., 2008; Verma et al., 226 
2010). In subsequent years, budgets were set in reference to both the number of high-227 
risk population estimated as well as in reference to the number of persons reached the 228 
previous year. Due to the challenges of mapping key populations such as female sex 229 
workers, NGOs may learn by experience that the number of estimated key population 230 
members is often down-biased. This underestimation may be due to several factors. 231 
Migration during special events (Devadasi Festival, Hijra) may be excluded from the 232 
estimated population, dependent on the time of the survey. Similarly, seasonal work 233 
may also affect the number of persons reached, which may not be captured when the 234 
mapping takes place. Additionally, hidden, hard-to-reach populations may not be picked 235 
up by mapping method. Although NGOs have an incentive to reach mapped populations, 236 
the project does not provide to give any additional financial incentive to reach hidden or 237 
unmeasured populations.  238 
Secondly, key population size is volatile; it may be affected by exogenous shocks such as 239 
climate shocks, since floods and droughts are common in the area of the study. 240 
Information that NGOs have regarding the level of persons reached in t-1, that informs 241 
their budgets, may therefore not correctly predict the number of person reached in t. 242 
NGOs are thus making decisions regarding the level of staff and consumables in a 243 
context of high uncertainty. This uncertainty may result in NGOs overestimating the 244 
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numbers of consumables and staff needed to be ready on a stand-by basis limiting the 245 
chance to observe diseconomies of scale.  246 
Thirdly, as Avahan scales-up it may become less costly to reach high-risk population 247 
through a reduction of HIV-related (or HIV service seeking) stigma. Avahan services 248 
become trusted by the community over time, NGOs sensitise community about 249 
HIV/AIDS through mass sensitization campaigns, celebration of World AIDS day, candle 250 
light memorial events for those who died of AIDS, local advocacy activities with police 251 
and political leaders. 252 
Finally, given that the funding were allocated to NGOs based on their expected results 253 
NGOs did not have an incentive to reach a certain level of persons where their marginal 254 
cost exceeded their “marginal revenue”. Thus, we hypothesise that the very large NGOs 255 
we observe are the ones that managed to reach a high number of persons at a low cost; 256 
and that the NGOs that would have had diseconomies of scale by reaching a similar 257 
number of persons would never be observed.  258 
Therefore, we anticipate that the incentives generated by Avahan’s programme and 259 
funding design lead to the absence of diseconomies of scale. 260 
3. Descriptive statistics 261 
Costs were obtained from NGOs, state level partners and the Bill and Melinda Gates 262 
foundation and are described in Chandrashekar et al. (2010). Costs include recurrent 263 
costs (personnel costs, project building and operating expenses, travel expenses, STI 264 
supplies, monitoring cost, information education & communication, training, condom 265 
supplies and indirect expenses) and capital costs (rent, equipment, furniture, vehicle, 266 
initial training, insurance and deposits, and start up cost).  267 
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The majority of costs (73%) for Avahan were incurred above the NGO level. An 268 
understanding of how this cost was allocated to NGOs is therefore pivotal to any 269 
investigation of economies of scale. Should the above service costs be determined by the 270 
levels of persons reached by each NGO then effectively they would be a variable cost; 271 
and lower economies of scale would be observed. However, if the allocation was made 272 
proportionally to each NGO, effectively programmatic cost would be a fixed cost which 273 
would increase the level of economies of scale observed. Methods for allocating 274 
programmatic costs to NGOs are complex as actual allocation is often difficult to 275 
observe. Our methods for allocating costs above the NGO level to NGOs were derived 276 
using a combination of programme records, expenditures reports and interviews with 277 
BMGF Avahan and SLP staff. The first step was to allocate national level programme 278 
costs to each SLP. This was done first by allocating specific grants to each SLP, and then 279 
for general programme management costs by using expenditure reports and mapping 280 
estimates of the key population covered by each SLP (the method reported by BMGF 281 
staff to be used for budget/ grant allocation to each SLP). Thereafter SLP costs 282 
(including BMGF costs) were first allocated to specific activity areas (for example 283 
programme management and expertise enhancement) within the SLP. This was done 284 
primarily on the basis of the description provided in detailed salaries reports and 285 
expenditure records; and where the allocation was not clear, interviews with SLP staff 286 
were conducted. Thereafter an allocation criterion for each activity cost was applied to 287 
allocate the cost to NGOs. The criteria used were derived after extensive interviews with 288 
staff on how they allocated their time and resources amongst NGOs. In the main, the 289 
allocation criterion used was either an equal division of cost, or an allocation based on 290 
estimated population size covered by the NGO. This latter measurement does not 291 
necessarily measure true output of each NGO, as they did not always covered the entire 292 
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population in need. However, this was the best information SLPs had to hand when 293 
allocated resources such as communication materials. For some activities, costs could 294 
be directly allocated as the expenditure records including this description. This latter 295 
situation particularly applied in the case of support and supervision costs where 296 
detailed travel records were often described. Items such as STI drugs management 297 
could also be directly allocated based on order levels.  298 
At the NGO level, costs were disaggregated by activity and input type. Field visits and 299 
time-sheets were conducted in order to estimate the share of labour costs allocated to 300 
different NGO sub-activities (outreach, community mobilisation, etc.). Unpaid volunteer 301 
time was estimated by the amount of time spent on the project and calculated based on 302 
peer educator salary. Other donated goods, such as commodities were valued using 303 
market prices. Capital costs were annualised using a discount rate of 3% and were 304 
assumed to have a life of between 5 and 10 years. Economic costs were computed 305 
valuing donated goods to their market price. All costs are presented in US$ 2008 in 306 
Table 1.  307 
Insert Table 1 308 
Table 2 presents the average cost (total and at the NGO level only) per person reached 309 
per year. The total average cost (that includes national level support cost) in the sample 310 
between 2004 and 2007 is US$231 while NGO only average cost is US$62. National level 311 
support costs contribute a large proportion of average cost (73%). We therefore 312 
conduct our analysis at both the NGO and total cost levels to provide a full picture of the 313 
existence of economies of scale. Typically, analyses of economies of scale focus on size of 314 
NGO examining only service delivery costs. However, if total costs are assessed and 315 
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given that national level support costs are primarily fixed in terms of NGO size, then the 316 
economies of scale may be greater. 317 
Insert Table 2 318 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics included as explanatory variables in the 319 
estimation. The scale measure, as defined by the number of high-risk persons reached, 320 
was obtained from routine monitoring systems and was non-missing for 125 NGOs. On 321 
average, a NGO has reached 1,869 persons over the 4 year period; however this 322 
increases by year, reaching only 793 persons on average in 2004 against 2,405 in 2007. 323 
Since the distribution of the scale measure is right skewed, the variable was log 324 
transformed.  325 
Insert Table 3 326 
The relationship between average cost, measured by the number of high-risk 327 
population reached and scale is represented in Figure 1. While, NGO average cost 328 
represents only a small proportion of total average cost, it is interesting to note that its 329 
relationship to scale has the same shape as the total average costs, confirming the 330 
absence of diseconomies of scale.  331 
Insert Figure 1 332 
4. Empirical Estimation 333 
From the above, we hypothesise that the presence of diseconomies of scale cannot be 334 
assumed to exist. We began our empirical estimation by testing this assumption by 335 
comparing a logarithmic form versus a quadratic functional form. We found that the 336 
logarithmic fit explains a larger share of the variance than the quadratic fit. One may 337 
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want to note that a reasonable reason for such finding comes from the fact that although 338 
the squared term is statistically significant at 1%, the minimum of the average NGO cost 339 
including and excluding programme costs is 6,995 and 5,595 high-risk persons reached 340 
respectively. This corresponds to the last percentile in both NGO average cost 341 
distributions as we observe only 4 and 3 NGOs respectively with diseconomies of scale. 342 
For this reason, a logarithmic functional form was used. 343 
Below, we present a parsimonious empirical model in order to understand the 344 
relationship between scale and average cost and to estimate unbiased economies of 345 
scale.  346 
General estimation 347 
We derive an equation to estimate the average cost curve empirically: 348 
(ACit) 1 it 2qit i it                   (4) 349 
where ACit is the average cost, note that we analyse both the NGO average cost that 350 
excludes programme cost AC_ngoit and the NGO average cost that includes programme 351 
costs (total average cost) AC_totit ; Yit  is the size of NGO i in year t and is proxied by the 352 
number of high-risk population reached by the Avahan programme,  is a proxy of the 353 
quality of the services provided to reached population. Given that we do not have any 354 
direct measure of the quality of outreach, we proxy the quality by the intensity of the 355 
outreach. We consider the intensity of the services provided as measured by the 356 
number of condoms distributed on average per person reached and the number of STI 357 
visits in the NGO clinic conducted on average for each person reached. Finally, ui is the 358 
NGO specific effect and eit is an error term. 359 
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Cost function in the very short run 360 
We first analyse the effect of scale on cost without any control variables (i.e. by 361 
removing it) in the very short run by adding temporal effects : 362 
(ACit) 1 it i it                                (4.1) 363 
The inclusion of time dummies for each year, effectively quantifies the economies of 364 
scale once the decisions regarding the level of inputs required for that year have been 365 
made.  366 
Cost function in the long run 367 
To explore the relationship between cost and scale in a longer run, we remove time 368 
dummies as presented in equation (4.2). Interpreting this relationship as the ‘true’ long 369 
run average cost curve, we implicitly assume that NGOs are operating at the minimum 370 
of the short run average cost curve. 371 
(ACit) it i it                                (4.2) 372 
However, there are good reasons to hypothesise that some NGOs are not observed at 373 
the minimum of their cost function; particularly NGOs that have not managed to reach 374 
full coverage of the estimated high-risk population in their catchment area, in the first 375 
few years of their start-up. Figure 2 supports this hypothesis, suggesting that average 376 
cost is lower when the number of persons reached (PR) is greater than the number of 377 
estimated population (EP) or when NGOs have reached a full coverage i.e. when 378 
PR/EP*100>100. Therefore, as a better proxy for the relationship between average cost 379 
and NGO size in the long run, we also decide to run the estimation only for the sub-380 
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sample of NGOs that have reached the estimated number of high-risk population in the 381 
district.  382 
Insert Figure 2 383 
Thus in equation (4.3) we conduct the same estimate as in equation (4.2) only for the 384 
sample of NGOs for whom the number of persons reached is greater than the number of 385 
estimated population, in order to have a better proxy of the long run average cost.  386 
(ACit) 1 it i it   if PR>EP                             (4.3) 387 
Causal inference 388 
To further explore the causal effect of scale-up on the average cost, we use a system 389 
GMM estimator as indicated in equation (4.4) and an IV approach presented in equation 390 
(4.5).  391 
The use of these methods was mainly motivated by the suspicion of reverse causality 392 
and between scale and average cost. There are two reasons to suspect the presence of 393 
reverse causality. Firstly, NGOs that have a high average cost may be less able to reach 394 
new population than NGOs that have a low average cost. Secondly, NGOs that manage to 395 
substantially increase the number of persons reached in year t may be rewarded by the 396 
funding agency through an increase in budget in t+1, and depending on the use of this 397 
additional budget it could result in an over- (if the additional budget increases technical 398 
efficiency) or underestimation (if it decreases technical efficiency) of the effect of scale 399 
on the NGO average cost. In both cases, we would observe that the effect of scale on 400 
average cost is biased.  401 
Regarding the GMM estimator in (4.4), first it is important to point out that the lagged 402 
dependent variable was not statistically significant, justifying the fact that we use the 403 
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GMM in a non-dynamic panel. The choice of the system GMM estimator is motivated by 404 
the fact that it has been found to be more efficient than the first-differenced GMM 405 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998). The two step robust variant of the GMM estimator used with 406 
finite-sample correction derived by Windmeijer (2005) is applied. To avoid bias due to a 407 
too large number of instruments, the GMM creates one instrument for every control 408 
variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag 409 
distance as suggested in Roodman (2006). In the model, we have only 4 instruments, we 410 
thus avoid the problem of too many instruments described in Roodman (2006). As 411 
shows in equation (4.4), we do not have any strictly exogenous variable nor 412 
predetermined variable. For the endogenous variable it, the second and third lagged 413 
values are used as instruments. Note that the instruments are first-differenced for use in 414 
the first difference equations and used for instrumenting the levels equations.  415 
(ACit 1 it i it                                                   (4.4) 416 
for i = 1,…, N and t = 2,…, T 417 
with E[ i  ]= E[ it  ]= E[ i it  ]=0     418 
The motivation for the use of the GMM is that, given the context of Avahan, there is no 419 
obvious reason that the level of scale in the past may directly affect the current average 420 
cost. One may argue that average cost might be partially determined by past scale, 421 
which requires to further question how Avahan funds have been allocated to NGOs. 422 
Interviews with Avahan NGOs and funders have highlighted that Avahan funding that 423 
NGOs received is mainly based on the NGOs previsions regarding their scale in year t 424 
rather than by past scale. Then it is likely that past scale may have an impact on current 425 
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scale that may in its turn affect current cost but it is unlikely that past scale may directly 426 
affect current average cost.   427 
Finally, we use an IV approach in order to test the robustness of the results obtained 428 
from the system GMM. To obtain a consistent estimator, we assume the existence of  429 
that firstly, satisfies the assumption that Cov( , it)=0, so that the IV is uncorrelated 430 
with the error term. The second requirement involves the relationship between the IV 431 
and the endogenous variable that Cov( , it)≠ 0. Thus, the instrument z needs to be 432 
strongly correlated with the number of persons reached but uncorrelated with other 433 
unobservable factors captured in the average cost error term. 434 
(ACit) 1 it i it                                            (4.5a) 435 
(Yit) 1 i it                   (4.5b) 436 
where 1≠0 and Cov( , it)=0. 437 
Finally, equations (4.6) are estimated to investigate the effect of scale-up on average 438 
cost once controlling for the quality of outreach services. 439 
(ACit) 1 it 2 it i it              (4.6a) 440 
(Yit) 1 2 it i it                   (4.6b) 441 
where 1≠0 and Cov( , it)=0  442 
There are two main types of variables that could potentially affect the average cost only 443 
through NGO size. The first type relates to variables determining the revenues received 444 
from the funding agency through the state level partner. In Avahan, grants are released 445 
every year to state level partners depending on the review of past progress reports, 446 
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future planned activities and intended coverage. Since there is a bargaining process 447 
between the NGO and the state level partner, there is a priori no exogenous determinant 448 
of NGO revenue that could be used as an exclusion restriction. Our construction of a 449 
plausible instrumental variable then relates to second type of variable, that explains the 450 
size of the high-risk population, without influencing costs: the demography of high-risk 451 
population. On such possible variable is an unanticipated climatic shock that may 452 
impact high risk population size and leads to an exogenous change in the NGO size. 453 
Droughts in India are frequent and severe – and it is plausible that they will influence 454 
both the demand and supply of sex work. In fact, a drought acts as a negative income 455 
shock and is expected to affect negatively the demand for prostitution, which should 456 
then in turn have a negative effect on the quantity of sex workers. For those reasons, we 457 
explore the presence of a drought in the intervention zone of the NGO as a proxy for a 458 
change in the number of high-risk populations. This variable is constructed by using the 459 
Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) that is computed using the data of Schneider et 460 
al. (2011). The SPI proposed by McKee, Doesken, and Kleist (1993) is calculated by first, 461 
fitting a gamma probability density function to the frequency distribution of rainfall 462 
over the reference period, here 1950 to 2000. The probability density function is then 463 
used to determine the cumulative probability of a particular precipitation level for a 464 
chosen time scale. Finally, the calculation is transformed into a normal distribution with 465 
a mean of 0 and a variance of 1 to obtain the SPI.  The values of the SPI can be grouped 466 
into various classes, where negative values indicate rainfalls below 467 
normal, and positive values indicate above normal rainfall. A SPI below -1 indicates dry 468 
conditions; the drought variable thus takes the value of 1 when the SPI is below -1 and 0 469 
otherwise. We obtained information on the intervention cities and villages of each NGO 470 
between 2004 and 2007. We then computed the SPI for each NGO by considering the 471 
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average rainfall in its intervention area. The intervention area was defined to be a 472 
radius of 45 kilometres around the NGO location and the radius was defined as the 473 
average distance of the intervention sites to the NGO location.   474 
Using an instrumental variable can only be justified where it is truly exogenous; it has a 475 
strong relationship with cost, and is a valid exclusion restriction i.e. uncorrelated 476 
directly with average cost. Firstly, regarding the exogeneity of the instrument, using the 477 
drought insures that the relationship between drought and the number of persons 478 
reached does not go in both directions. Secondly, regarding the weakness of the 479 
instrument, a potential problematic issue is that a drought may not affect high-risk 480 
populations in rural and urban areas in the same way. In fact, a drought may decrease 481 
the number of sex workers in rural areas through the decrease in demand by 482 
agricultural income of farmers. However, a drought may simultaneously increase the 483 
number of sex workers in urban centres, assuming that (1) rural women may take up 484 
sex work if they consider that it can offer them a higher and more sustainable income 485 
than farming activities and (2) sex workers will migrate to places where the demand 486 
will be higher. The occurrence of (1) and/or (2) is an issue only if it results in a greater 487 
demand for prostitution is urban centres, which may not be the case since droughts may 488 
increase the price of non-tradable goods in cities as well, we may then also observe a 489 
lower demand for prostitution in urban centres. If NGOs located in urban areas are able 490 
to reach more high-risk populations after a drought has occurred then it would result in 491 
the weakness of the IV since the negative effect of the IV on the number of persons 492 
reached in the rural parts of the NGO intervention may be offset by its positive effect in 493 
the urban ones. We therefore present F-stats in the first stage equation to show 494 
evidence of a strong relationship between the drought and NGO size. Additionally, the 495 
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failure of monotonicity is also not likely to be an issue here since we do not expect any 496 
heterogeneous effect of scale on the average cost.  497 
Thirdly, regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction, the instrument will be invalid 498 
if a drought affects prices of commodities bought by NGOs, NGO labour and transport 499 
costs. Regarding commodities prices (mainly condoms and STI kits prices), one may 500 
want to note that commodities are not bought by NGOs on the local market but are 501 
distributed from state level partners. State level partners purchase in bulk and 502 
distribute to NGOs based on intend of their requirement. Commodities prices are 503 
negotiated by the state level partner with the supplier and commodities are provided to 504 
all NGOs contracting with the state level partner at the same price. Regarding the effect 505 
on labour, the instrument would also be invalid if it negatively affects cost through a 506 
reduction in labour cost. In fact, NGO staff facing a diminution of their real wage due to 507 
the increase in prices generated by a drought may demand higher wages, we would 508 
then observed a decreasing effect of drought on labour costs, which is not the case as 509 
shown in Appendix 1. Moreover, since labour price is fixed and decided at the beginning 510 
of the financial year, a change in wage within the year is not likely to occur. In order to 511 
explore this potential pathway, total labour cost was regressed on the NGO size and the 512 
drought variable in the panel model with NGOs fixed effects, and the drought variable 513 
was not a predictor of labour costs as shown Appendix 1. Note that similar conclusion is 514 
found when regressing recurrent, capital costs as well as NGO, state level partner and 515 
BMGF costs on the drought variable. Regarding the effect on transport cost, conversely 516 
to floods, droughts will have no effect on the quality of roads. Regarding fuel cost, there 517 
are not many reasons to believe that they could be affected by a drought especially in 518 
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India where fuel prices were regulated, deregulation of petrol occurred in 2010 while 519 
diesel and kerosene prices are still under the Government control.   520 
Lastly, if drought was positively affecting average cost through an increase in input 521 
prices, this should result in an overestimation of the effect of scale on the persons 522 
reached after correcting for the endogeneity, thus using the drought as an instrumental 523 
variable ensures that we would never conclude wrongly that there are no economies of 524 
scale.  525 
In the sample, 11% of the NGOs have experienced a drought in their intervention area 526 
between 2004 and 2007, although this proportion has varied a lot over time since the 527 
drought that occurred in 2004 affected 31% of the NGOs intervention area while 2%, 528 
9% and 1% of the intervention areas were affected by a drought in 2005, 2006 and 529 
2007 respectively. Maps presented in appendix 2 provides further evidence of the 530 
drought variability in the districts surveyed.  531 
5. Results 532 
NGO average costs excluding programme costs 533 
In column (4.1) of Table 4, we can see that once the NGO has made investment decisions 534 
for the financial year, the economies of scale are high because the NGO is deprived of all 535 
leeway to minimize cost over the financial year, since most of the costs are considered 536 
as fixed in the short run. If an NGO scale of activity increases by 1% over the year, the 537 
average cost decreases by 0.56%. 538 
When we try to capture a relationship between average cost and scale in the longer run 539 
assuming that input factors become variable we can see that the level economies of 540 
scale decreases. In this case if the NGO size increases by 1%, the average cost decreases 541 
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by 0.19%. When we restrict the sample to the NGOs that have reached full coverage in 542 
column (4.3), we can see that the economies of scale are much lower, although the SE 543 
increases due to the lower sample size, resulting in the insignificance of the scale 544 
variable.  545 
The causal effect of scale-up on average cost is explored by the use of the system GMM 546 
in (4.4) and an IV in (4.5) and (4.6).  Overidentification tests are used to test whether 547 
the excluded instrumental variables are independent of the error terms and can be 548 
considered as valid. The tests are conducted by regressing the residuals from the IV 549 
regression on all instrumental variables. The non-rejection of the null hypothesis leads 550 
to the conclusion that the overidentifying restriction is valid. The p-values of the 551 
overidentification tests Sargan and Hansen tests confirm the validity of the lagged 552 
values as instruments in the GMM. The F-stats superior to 10 in the first stage equation 553 
of the IV suggests that drought is strongly negatively correlated to scale-up. The two 554 
methods correcting the endogeneity of scale suggest that the effect of scale-up on 555 
average cost is over-estimated in previous models. Once we correct for the reverse 556 
causality, scale has no effect on NGO average cost. An increase in scale in 1% reduced 557 
the average cost by 0.11% in the GMM system estimate, while IV estimates suggest that 558 
there are no economies of scale.  559 
When quality proxies are added in the IV estimate, we can see that providing outreach 560 
services of a higher quality increases NGO average cost. Then it is important to question 561 
whether scale-up has not occurred at the cost of quality. To explore this possibility, the 562 
number of STI visits and the number of condoms distributed per person reached were 563 
regressed on NGO size. We find that an increase in scale has no effect on the number of 564 
STI visits per person reached and is positively correlated to the number of condoms 565 
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distributed per person reached. It is conceivable that when NGOs reach full coverage of 566 
their estimated population, and with no incentive to increase beyond this they may 567 
decide to maximise future budgets by decreasing the intensity of the services provided. 568 
However, this was not found in the data when running the estimates only when PR>EP. 569 
This suggests that the incentives given by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have 570 
allowed NGOs to maximise quantity and that this did not occur at the cost of quality.  571 
Insert Table 4 572 
NGO average cost including programme costs 573 
When focusing on total NGO average costs presented in Table 5, we can see that 574 
economies of scale are very high. This is due to the fact that national level support cost 575 
is primarily characterised as fixed cost. Our results suggest that while in the very short 576 
run, an increase in 1% in NGO size would result in a decrease in the average cost of 577 
0.88%, this percentage will drop to 0.61% in a long run perspective. It is interesting to 578 
note that the GMM estimator used to correct for reverse causality leads to similar result 579 
than the panel fixed effects estimator, suggesting that the reverse causality issue is not 580 
of importance when programme costs are included. This illustrates the fact that NGOs 581 
have little room for manoeuvre in determining their total average cost.  582 
Insert Table 5 583 
Predicted and actual costs when scaling-up the initiative are presented in Appendix 3.  584 
6. Discussion 585 
We find that the scale up of HIV prevention in India is associated with high economies of 586 
scale using a method that is robust for endogeneity biases; this finding suggests that 587 
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scaling up HIV prevention services is feasible and is a source of efficiency. Additionally, 588 
we find no evidence of diseconomies of scale in our sample of NGOs since only 4 Avahan 589 
NGOs out of the 111 included in our analysis have experienced diseconomies of scale. 590 
We demonstrate that this finding is implicit to Avahan design and mechanism funding in 591 
Avahan since NGOs funding was based on target objectives and there was no incentive 592 
to reach more people than what the NGOs got funding for.  593 
When we consider only the cost incurred at the NGO level, we find no evidence of 594 
economies of scale once we correct for reverse causality and other potential sources of 595 
endogeneity. This latter finding conflicts with previous descriptive evidence, and may 596 
be justified in several ways. Firstly, most of the high-risk populations reached (female 597 
sex workers and men who have sex with men) are street-based, preventing the peer-598 
educators to reach many individuals at one time. Secondly, NGOs have to provide a mix 599 
of services that includes STI treatment and condom distribution preventing from 600 
receiving high specialization gains. Finally, most of consumables (condom, STI kits) are 601 
bought at a fixed price that does not vary with the size of the NGOs.   602 
But our results nevertheless suggest that for those planning the scale-up of HIV 603 
prevention services more generally at the national and global level, cost estimates 604 
should include the presence of high economies of scale, driven by large programmatic 605 
costs. Our findings suggest that the total cost function would, after a short initial 606 
increase; rapidly settle to a steady state. This is broadly in line with the approach taken 607 
by the recent resource estimates made by UNAIDS for their Strategic Investment 608 
Framework. Our findings also suggest that programmatic costs should not be allocated 609 
as total mark-up of site level costs; but should primarily be treated as a fixed costs in 610 
any resource requirements model. The question still remains on how fixed 611 
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programmatic costs vary as one adds on new services; so this only applies on when 612 
estimating costs of a set HIV prevention package.   613 
The most important policy recommendation to draw from our results is that cost 614 
savings are possible by increasing the size of the NGOs to expand coverage. 615 
Consideration to encouraging NGOs to merge or work together may realise further 616 
economies of scale. However, any efficiency gains from encouraging large NGOs to 617 
provide services must be balanced with other possible benefits from small NGOs. Unlike 618 
private for profit organisations, the ability of an NGO to offer services to marginalised 619 
populations may lie in its roots and connections with the population it serves. As we 620 
observe no diseconomies of scale, we can assume that the Avahan design prevents from 621 
reaching the optimal size of NGO. On the other side, avoiding to have diseconomies of 622 
scale is attractive and for this reason the Avahan design may be then of interest for 623 
African low and middle countries planning to scale up HIV prevention.  624 
Over the period studied NGOs have demonstrated that it is feasible to substantially 625 
increase the quantity of persons reached; but that this may have been influenced by 626 
information and programmatic incentives. In fact, by looking at the distribution of 627 
persons reached per month presented in Appendix 4, it can be observed that in 2005, 628 
NGOs that reached the estimated number of targeted population did not put as much 629 
effort to reach new populations as NGOs that did not reach the estimated number of 630 
targeted high-risk population. This may be explained by the fact that many NGOs 631 
entered Avahan in 2005; and these NGOs and may have lacked information regarding 632 
the estimated population. However, we can see from Appendix 4 that the scale trend 633 
follows the same pattern in 2006 and 2007 for NGOs that did and did not reach the 634 
estimated number of targeted population. This indicates that NGOs that have reached 635 
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estimated population still continue to reach a similar proportion of new population 636 
member than the ones that had not reached the estimated population at this time.  637 
The methodological implications of the study are that it may be important for future 638 
analyses of economies of scale of health service costs to consider that scale-up is 639 
endogenous to average cost. Reverse causality appears to be the main source of 640 
endogeneity at the NGO level since the use of the panel estimator with NGO fixed effects 641 
allows controlling for time-invariant characteristics of the NGOs that may be correlated 642 
with scale. However, we also recommend that those undertaking similar analysis with 643 
cross sectional data should give a special attention to the endogeneity issue, since the 644 
effect of scale on average cost could be biased due to time-constant unobserved 645 
heterogeneity. The direction of the bias in this case will depend on the correlation 646 
between those omitted variables and scale. Then, it is a priori hard to know how the 647 
scale coefficient will be biased, which justifies the use of appropriate methods to deal 648 
with endogeneity. Overall our conclusion that there are no economies of scale when 649 
excluding programme costs can be clearly seen to rely heavily on the validity of the 650 
instrument variables used.  651 
Our original findings however have to take into account that this study has some 652 
limitations. Firstly, our findings at the programme level are somewhat dependent on the 653 
methods we used to allocate programme level costs. We are confident that our 654 
estimation of programme costs is robust given the work we have conducted to track 655 
those costs and for untracked costs to understand the determinants of above level costs. 656 
This is mainly explained by the fact that most of the above level costs have been 657 
allocated to specific NGOs and could be tracked easily. Although our methods are 658 
robust, there remains some uncertainty, since all expenditures were not directly 659 
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tracked and our results also suggest some measurement error in this regard. Secondly, 660 
one may want to note that we developed a parsimonious model in order to better 661 
understand the relationship between scale and cost. In fact, the inclusion of many 662 
covariates would have complicated the understanding of the biases. For this reason, the 663 
study did not aim to provide a broad analysis of the determinants of average cost and 664 
this will be conducted in a future study. Thirdly, the findings regarding the effect of 665 
scale up on average cost only focuses on provider costs. These may be of interest for 666 
decision-makers but do not take into account user costs or other societal factors such as 667 
the accessibility of the NGOs. In the sample, most of the NGOs operate alone over a 668 
single district, thus increasing NGOs size may also result in other planning issues that 669 
cannot be predicted. Fourthly, although we see no inverse relationship between scale 670 
and quality, our measures of quality are service orientated, and may not capture the 671 
greater complexity of providing acceptable services to high-risk populations. Finally, 672 
while we present an analysis of one of the largest datasets available globally on HIV 673 
prevention costs, our study remains highly context specific, so we strongly recommend 674 
that similar studies are carried out in other settings. These studies need to be planned 675 
in advance, as the Avahan data is unique in the sense it was captured prospectively 676 
throughout the scale up process. This has enabled the use of panel estimation, thus 677 
strengthening our findings.  678 
Conclusion 679 
We quantified the degree of economies for scale that have resulted from the scale-up of 680 
the Avahan initiative; the largest HIV prevention project conducted so far. We use GMM 681 
and IV approaches to estimate unbiased economies of scale. We find that the scale-up of 682 
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Avahan has generated high economies of scale suggesting that cost savings are possible 683 




Table 1: Total economic costs by organisational level and input from 2004 to 2008 (in 686 
US$ 2008) 687 
 688 
State level Partner 689 
INPUT 2004-05 % 2005-06 % 2006-07 % 2007-08 % Total % 
Capital cost 3,21,707 10% 
    
7,10,314  9% 
       
7,40,217  8% 
       
8,28,565  9% 
    
26,00,803  9% 
Personnel 14,61,108 44% 
  
33,26,119  43% 
    
33,46,931  37% 
    
37,94,869  40% 
 
1,19,29,028  40% 
Travel 2,60,931 8% 
    
5,83,292  8% 
       
5,52,527  6% 
       
7,94,457  8% 
    
21,91,207  7% 
Building operating 
& maintenance 1,28,889 4% 
    
6,85,979  9% 
       
8,75,273  10% 
       
8,39,026  9% 
    
25,29,167  9% 
Commodities and 
supplies 3,15,164 9% 
    
9,28,084  12% 
    
11,37,772  13% 
    
11,30,847  12% 
    
35,11,867  12% 
Monitoring & 
Evaluation 4,73,509 14% 
    
5,78,504  7% 
       
7,26,454  8% 
       
4,30,071  5% 
    
22,08,540  7% 
Trainings 3,02,135 9% 
    
6,12,627  8% 
    
12,48,216  14% 
    
10,27,480  11% 
    
31,90,457  11% 
Indirect Expenses 69,596 2% 
    
3,49,340  4% 
       
3,89,641  4% 
       
6,58,639  7% 
    
14,67,216  5% 




















District Level (NGO) 691 
INPUT 2004-05 % 2005-06 % 2006-07 % 2007-08 % Total % 
Capital cost 3,35,362 15% 7,71,906 11% 9,86,912 9% 12,42,946 9% 33,37,127 10% 
Personnel 9,88,547 43% 32,48,881 47% 45,57,267 43% 63,35,755 44% 1,51,30,451 44% 
Travel 1,48,326 6% 4,56,460 7% 6,96,232 7% 9,73,823 7% 22,74,841 7% 
Building 
operating & 

























Evaluation 1,19,348 5% 91,711 1% 89,520 1% 1,52,707 1% 4,53,286 1% 
Trainings 1,03,761 5% 2,28,316 3% 3,88,067 4% 6,47,648 4% 13,67,792 4% 
Indirect 
Expenses 7,958 0% 33,313 0% 1,51,883 1% 1,40,755 1% 3,33,906 1% 
Grand Total 22,95,137 100 69,41,539 100 1,06,49,697 100 1,45,41,746 100 3,44,28,119 100 
 692 




 Table 2: Average cost per person reached over time in US$2008 695 
Year NGO average 
cost 
National level cost Total average 
cost State Level Partner 
cost 




2004 65 180 211 456 
2005 64 80 137 281 
2006 59 54 58 169 
2007 61 40 38 139 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables in the sample 699 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AC_tot 387 230.884 451.1441 36.8 5597.4 
Log(AC_tot) 389 5.060426 0.803372 3.605498 10.37525 
AC_ngo 386 61.98771 56.46357 9.259 440.8 
Log(AC_ngo) 388 3.905978 0.729109 2.230014 8.261216 
Y 388 1868.66 1729.984 20 12071 
Log(Y) 388 7.147942 0.972623 2.995732 9.398561 
STI/Y 388 0.772854 0.81042 0 10.75 
Condom/Y 388 248.4381 242.5125 0 1561.993 
  700 
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Table 4: Relationship between scale and NGO average cost 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5a) (4.5b) (4.6a) (4.6b) 
VARIABLES AC_ngoit AC_ngoit AC_ngoit AC_ngoit AC_ngoit it AC_ngoit it 
it -0.558*** -0.193*** -0.0679 -0.115 -0.0176  0.0716  
 (0.0676) (0.0546) (0.0848) (0.0680) (0.207)  (0.187)  
2005 (ref:2004) 0.636***        
 (0.0839)        
2006 0.851***        
 (0.101)        
2007 1.061***        
 (0.125)        
STI/ it       0.262*** -0.298*** 
       (0.0685) (0.0558) 
Condom/ it       0.000591** 0.000134*** 
       (0.000291) (0.000201) 
Drought       -0.6097***  -0.4236*** 
      (0.151)  (0.145) 
Constant 7.138*** 5.261*** 4.198*** 4.694*** 4.214***  10.418*** 3.436*** 10.523*** 
 (0.421) (0.390) (0.647) (0.488) (0.893) (0.562) (1.004) (0.649) 
NGO Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 386 386 185 386 367  367  
R-squared 0.451 0.105 0.010  0.045  0.368  
Number of NGOs 130 130 90 130 111  111  
Sargan test p-value    0.84     
Hansen test p-value    0.61     
Cragg-Donald F-stat      16.25  9.10 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) presents the results considering the very short run. Column (2) is the basic estimation with NGO fixed 
effects. Column (3) is the same model as in column (2) estimated for the sub-sample of NGOs that have reached a higher number of high-risk populations than the one estimated in 
the catchment area. Column (4) is the GMM model that uses lagged values of the scale as instruments for scale. Column (5a) is the IV estimation that uses drought as an instrument. 
First stage equation for this model is presented in column (5b). Column (6) is the same model than in Column (5a) except that it includes the quality of outreach as covariate. First 
stage equation for this model is presented in column (6b) 
36 
 
Table 5: Relationship between scale and average cost at the programme level 
 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5a) (4.5b) (4.6a) (4.6b) 
VARIABLES AC_totit AC_totit AC_totit AC_totit AC_totit it AC_totit it 
it -0.888*** -0.685*** -0.614*** -0.670*** -0.767***  -0.823***  
 (0.0260) (0.0224) (0.0344) (0.0494) (0.0938)  (0.116)  
2005 (ref:2004) 0.496***        
 (0.0429)        
2006 0.543***        
 (0.0494)        
2007 0.621***        
 (0.0543)        
STI/ it       0.0347 -0.298*** 
       (0.0426) (0.0558) 
Condom/ it       0.000745*** 0.000134*** 
       (0.000182) (0.000201) 
Drought       -0.6097***  -0.4232*** 
      (0.151)  (0.145) 
Constant 10.91*** 9.931*** 9.328*** 9.838***  10.418***  10.523*** 
 (0.163) (0.161) (0.263) (0.354)  (0.562)  (0.649) 
NGO Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 387 387 186 387 368  368  
R-squared 0.867 0.786 0.770  0.774  0.839  
Number of NGOs 130 130 90 130 111  111  
Sargan test p-value    0.32     
Hansen test p-value    0.04     
Cragg-Donald F-stat      16.23  9.07 
 
Standard errors are  in parentheses, ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) presents the results considering the very short run. Column (2) is the basic estimation with NGO fixed 
effects. Column (3) is the same model as in column (2) estimated for the sub-sample of NGOs that have reached a higher number of high-risk populations than the one estimated in 
the catchment area. Column (4) is the GMM model that uses lagged values of the scale as instruments for scale. Column (5a) is the IV estimation that uses drought as an instrument. 
First stage equation for this model is presented in column (5b). Column (6) is the same model than in Column (5a) except that it includes the quality of outreach as covariate. First 
stage equation for this model is presented in column (6b) 
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Appendix 1: Effect of drought on several costs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Log(NGO_cost) Log(SLP_cost) Log(BMGF_cost) Log(recurrent_cost) Log(capital_cost) Log(labour_cost) 
it 0.794*** 0.187*** 0.0686* 0.936*** 0.466*** 0.766*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0347) (0.0372) (0.0610) (0.0433) (0.0572) 
Drought -0.123 0.0856 0.0621 -0.147 -0.0410 -0.140 
 (0.100) (0.0633) (0.0822) (0.116) (0.0820) (0.103) 
Observations 367 368 368 367 367 367 
R-squared 0.676 0.171 0.025 0.643 0.561 0.624 
Number of ngo 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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